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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF INSURANCE
IN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
As a matter of strict logic, evidence that a defendant in a negligence
action is protected by liability insurance is immaterial. Furthermore,
such evidence is generally considered anathema in the trial of negli-
gence cases because of the fear that knowledge of insurance may un-
duly prejudice juries. A legal doctrine has thus developed that evi-
dence of insurance is inadmissible and, in certain cases, jury knowl-
edge of insurance coverage is of such prejudicial nature as to con-
stitute reversible error.1 An observation of the recent cases from
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicates a tendency to apply
the doctrine in a more lenient fashion. Whether this doctrine has
become outmoded in automobile negligence actions is the subject of
this comment.
The recent decision in Creteau v. Phoenix Assurance Co.2 suggests
a difficulty arising out of the doctrine prohibiting intimations of in-
surance from reaching the jury. The case concerned the liability of an
insurer under the Uninsured Motorist Statute.3 This statute is in-
tended to protect the insured user of the highway from personal and
property damages resulting from the action of a financially irrespon-
sible uninsured motorist.
4
In the Creteau case the plaintiff recovered a $5,ooo judgment
against the driver of the other automobile in the collision in which
she was injured. As the driver of the other vehicle was uninsured
and without property to satisfy the judgment, the damages remained
unpaid. The plaintiff thereupon filed an amended motion for judg-
ment against her insurance company alleging that her insurer had
actual notice of the time, place, and date of the trial of the suit against
the uninsured defendant; that the insurance company had its counsel
1Nash, Law of Evidence § 85 (1954); 2 Wigmore § 282(a) (3 d ed. i'lo).
2O2 Va. 641, 119 S.E.2d 336 (ig6i).
Wa. Code Ann. § 38. 38.t i-3 8i(b) (Supp. 296o) providles:
"Nor shall any such policy or contract be so issued or delivered unless
it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured
all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits which shall
be no less than the requirements of § 46.1-1(8), as amended from time to
time, of the Code herein. Such endorsements of provisions shall also provide
for no less than five thousand dollars coverage for injury to or destruction
of the property of the insured in any one accident but may provide an ex-
clusion of the first two hundred dollars of such loss or damage."
4Virginia House Joint Resolution No. 39 (1956).
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present in the court during the trial of the case, though he did not
participate therein; and that her attorney had requested the clerk
of court to serve process in that suit upon the insurance company but
that the clerk had refused.
The defendant insurance company's demurrer to the amended
motirn for judgment was sustained in the trial court and affirmed
on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on the ground
that the plaintiff had not complied with the statute in that process
was not served on Phoenix in plaintiff's action against the uninsured
motorist.5
If one may speculate as to the circumstances lying behind the bare
factual record set forth in this opinion, one can see that the problem
of enforcing the liability of an insurance company under the unin-
sured motorist statute is complicated. If the insurance company is
to be served with process the motion for judgment must in some way
indicate that such service is proper or else the clerk of court may
refuse to issue the process.0 However, if the insurance company is
mentioned in the motion for judgment, which is then read to the jury,
this may run afoul of the doctrine that in negligence cases the issue
of insurance coverage is irrelevant and, in certain instances, inform-
ing the jury of same constitutes reversible error.' The dilemma here
is how to bring the insurance company into court to face its statutory
liability and yet not at the same time prejudice the jury in favor of
the plaintiff by informing the jury that -the damages incurred against
the defendant will in fact be borne by an insurance company? A
fair solution necessitates an examination of the law regarding exclu-
sion of evidence of insurance in negligence cases.
Our exegesis of the doctrine excluding evidence of insurance
commences with Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Knight,8 in
which the problem of the admissibility of insurance coverage was
touched upon. The court stated that "the fact that the defendant was
insured against accidents could throw no light upon the question of
whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence." 9
The Virginia rule upon the subject was expounded more fully in
the case of Rinehart & Dennis Co. v. Brown,'0 which held that "evi-
202 Va. at 645, 119 S.E.2d at 340.
GVa. Code Ann. § 38.-38t(e)(1) (Supp. 196o). See 202 Va. 641, 645, 119 S.E.2d 336,
31o. 7Nash, Law of Evidence § 85 (1954); 2 Wigmore § 282(a) (Sd ed. 19lo).
"1o6 Va. 674, 56 S.E. 725 (1907).
11d. at 681, 56 S.E. at 728.
1"37 Va. 670, 120 S.E. 269 (1923).
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dence of such insurance is irrelevant and inadmissible in an action
against a defendant for a negligent injury.""' The court said further
that such irrelevant evidence may be prejudicial and there is no pre-
sumption of harmless error.12 The apparent harshness of the doctrine
was assuaged somewhat by the acceptance of the harmless error doc-
trine in Irvine v. Carr.13 The holding that a mere inadvertent mention
of insurance by counsel in an otherwise fair trial was not in itself
sufficient error to warrant a mistrial, 14 marked the first of a series of
judicial exceptions to the rule.
The fact of insurance coverage was brought to the jury's attention
in Highway Express Lines v. Fleming' and yet the court affirmed
judgment for the plaintiff. The evidence of insurance came out inci-
dentally in the cross-examination of one of the defendant's witnesses
who happened to be an insurance agent. Evidence that the witness
was employed by the defendant's insurance company was held admis-
sible under the "rule that a litigant has a right to establish facts
and circumstances tending to show the interest, bias or prejudice of a
hostile witness."
Two recent cases show that the court has adopted a more lenient
attitude towards the admission of matters pertaining to insurance
coverage. In Phillips v. Campbell17 a new trial was granted upon the
discovery that the jury had discussed and considered whether or not
the defendant was covered by -insurance. In Simmons v. Boyd' s a
new -trial was granted because the fact of insurance coverage was
inadvertedly injected into evidence by a doctor who, testifying as
plaintiff's witness, read a letter which contained the sentence: "This
is an insurance case."'19 In both Phillips and Simmons the damages
awarded on the first trial, in which the juries had considered in-
"Id. at 675, 120 S.E. at 271.
"The Rinehart case was followed by Lanham v. Bond, 157 Va. 167, 16o S.E. 89
(i93i), which held that counsel's repeated reference to the insurance coverage of
the defendant was reversible error.
13163 Va. 662, 177 S.E. 208 (1934).
141d. at 669, 177 S.E. at 211. However, the harmless error doctrine in itself has
limitations. In Dozier v. Morrisette, 198 Va. 37, 92 S.E.2d 366 (1956), the agent of
the insurance company, which insured both of the parties in the negligence action
spoke to- jurors during a recess and informed them as to the insurance aspects
of the case. The court held that this error was not harmless and reversed for a
new trial.
15185 Va. 666, 40 SXE.2d 294 (1946).
2Id. at 672, 40 S.E.2d at 298.
172oo Va. 136, 104 S.E.2d 762 (1958).
sgg Va. 8o6, 102 S.E.2d 292 (1958).
'Id. at 812, 102 S.E.2d at 296.
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surance, were substantially larger than those awarded on the second
trial, in which evidence of insurance was kept from the jury. None-
theless, the Supreme Court of Appeals reinstated -the original verdicts
in both cases.20
Perhaps the most interesting case in the series from -the standpoint
of this subject is that of Norfolk & P. Belt Line R.R. v. Jones,2 1 sus-
taining a verdict for the plaintiff in a wrongful death action. The
original motion for judgment had been brought in the name of the
administrator, but was amended on motion of the defendant to read
in the name of the administrator "and for the benefit of the Ameri-
can Mutual Liability Ins. Co., as its interests may appear."
"Counsel for the plaintiff, in the opening statement, said
that it was for the benefit of the widow and son. That was the
truth; it was also for the benefit of the insurance company.
Ordinarily we keep from the jury the fact that the plaintiff
was insured, but we are of the opinion that one has a right
to tell the jury what the record shows. It might be that a widow
and child had received complete pecuniary compensation. In
such circumstances it would not be fair to tell the jury that the
action was for their benefit and so appeal to its sympathy. It
should know the facts."
22
21A comparison of the two cases is interesting:
Phillips v. Campbell Evidence of insurance not Verdict on sec- Original ver-
introduced but the jury had ond trial of dict of $25,-
discussed it amongst them- $75oo. ooo reinstated.
selves.
Simmons v. Boyd Evidence of insurance intro- Verdict on sec- Original ver-
duced by letter to doctor ond trial of dict of $20,-
read by witness containing $6500. ooo reinstated.
sentence: "This is an in-
surance case."
24,83 Va. 536, 32 S.E.2d 720 (1945).
-Id. at 544-545, 32 S.E.2d at 724. The holding of Norfolk & P. Belt Line R.R.
v. Jones has been modified somewhat by Miller v.Tomlinson, 194 Va. 367, 73 S.E.2d
378 (1952). Plaintiffs brought suit for their trucks which were destroyed in a fire
which consumed defendants' garage. Upon motion of the defendants the trial court
ordered endorsements placed upon the notices of motion for judgment after the
name of each plaintiff, reading: "who sues for himself and the State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company as their interest may appear." The court held that
it was improper to require the endorsements and that the plaintiffs had a right
to have the issues decided by the jury free from influence with which it was not
concerned. The court said the holding was in accord with § 8-96 which reads: "Noth-
ing in this section shall be construed to permit the joinder, or addition as a new
party, of any insurance company on account of the issuance to any party to a cause
of any policy or contract of liability insurance for the benefit ... of any party to any
cause." It should be noted that this case deals only with the problem presented
hy joining an insurance company as a party.
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Thus the court has held that under the proper circumstances it is not
prejudicial for the matter of insurance coverage to come to the at-
tention of the jury if set forth as a necessary part of the record.
This would seem to offer a solution to the problem posed by
the decision of the Creteau case. It is necessary that the insurance
company in some manner be named in the motion for judgment or
related papers in order that the clerk of court will issue the process.
Three alternatives are suggested:
(i) Name the insurance company as a party in the motion for
judgment.23
(2) Attach a separate certificate to the motion for judgment stat-
ing that the plaintiff intends to rely upon Code section 38.1- 3 8i(b)
and requesting that the clerk of court issue a notice of motion
for judgment upon the insurance company. This certificate would be
analogous to the common law pmecipe. 24
(3) Name the insurance company in the motion for judgment
in such manner that the clerk of court will not question the propriety
of issuing process.25 In light of the fact that the motion for judg-
ment may be read to the jury, the insurance company, in entering
an appearance, might move to amend the motion for judgment so
that knowledge of insurance would not go to the jury by that means.
In regard to the third alternative it should be pointed out that
it seems to be in accord with the holding of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals 4n Norfolk & P. Belt Line R.R. v. Jones that one "has
the right to tell ,the jury what the record shows," and the statute pro-
vides no other means whereby the insurer may be brought into court.
Other jurisdictions have held that evidence of insurance is admissible
and not prejudicial when the insurer is a party to the record.
26
'3This is perhaps an improvident suggestion in light of the fact that § 38.1-
381(e)(i) provides for service of process upon the insurance company "as though
such insurance company were a party defendant" but does not actually make the
insurance company a party defendant.
mThis alternative would require a legislative amendment to § 38.i-38i(e)(i).
-A suggested notation is: "Service of notice of motion for judgement upon
the X Insurance Company shall be made in accordance with § 38.1-381(e)(t) of
the Code."
-1New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. ig6o); Batts
v. Carter, 312 P.2d 472 (Okla. 1957); Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E.2d 400
(1949); Reeves v. Tittle, 129 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Engler v. Hatton,
12 S.W.2d 99o (Tex. Com. App. 1929); Roeske v. Schmitt, 266 Wis. 557, 64 N.V.2d
.94 (1954); Vuchetich v. General Cas. Co., 270 Wis. 552, 72 N.W.2d 389 (1955).
Contra, Turner v. Boleyn, 243 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1951); Turner v. Smith, 313 Ky.
635, 232 S.W.2d ioo6 (1950); Pecor v. Home Indem. Co., 234 Wis. 40 7 , 291 N.W.
313 (1940); Sheehan v. Lewis, 218 Wis. 588, 26o N.W. 633 (1935).
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The rule forbidding evidence of insurance in negligence cases
arose in an era when liability insurance was not as common as it is
today. Because of the fact that most Virginia motorists have liability
insurance2 and because of the Virginia uninsured motorist statute,
it is safe to say that an overwhelming majority of automotive negli-
gence cases being tried do involve insurance. Intelligent jurors know
this. '- For this reason the courts in Virginia would do well to abolish
the restriction on evidence of liability insurance in automobile cases
altogether. This would bring the trial of such cases closer to the
ideal of complete disclosure.2 9 The objection of relevance would still
be applicable but the indeterminate effects of suppressed evidence
or the jury's speculation on the insurance aspects of the case would be
done way with.
JOHN A. PAUL
2"Between October 1, 1958, and June 1, 1959, 6% of the motor vehicles regis-
tered in Virginia were uninsured." Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. 145, note i (961).
"In this enlightened age it is common knowledge, and everybody knows
that almost every owner of an automobile carries liability insurance, hence
everybody knows how it is obtained and the manner of protection." Sim-
mons v. Boyd, 199 Va. 8o6, 813, 102 S.E.2d 292, 297 (1958).
's "As of today the public and jurors are more insurance conscious ....
One is indeed naive who does not know that most jurors are now aware
of the fact that defendants in this character of tort action are, in a decided
majority of instances, protected, in whole or in part, by public liability
insurance and that such jurors often take that circumstance into considera-
tion to some degree in their deliberations on what damages shall be
awarded." Phillips v. Campbell, 2oo Va. 136, 143, 1o4 S.E.2d 765, 769
(1958).
''By dictum in Highway Express Lines v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 671-672, 40
S.E.2d 291, 297 (1946) the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the
wholesome quality of complete disclosure:
"Actually the real defendant is the insurance carrier and this fact should
be known to the court and jury, otherwise the court becomes a party to
'benevolent judicial concealment.' If this class of evidence is not admitted,
then the presence and interest of the actual defendant is never made known.
The exclusion of such evidence is incompatible with an open court and
judgments openly and publicly arrived at. 'To compel and permit such pro-
ceedings is to countenance and participate in what is tantamount to a
fraud.'"
The court cited Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 74o (1935); Jessup v. Davis,
115 Neb. 1, 211 N.W. 190 (1925); Pavilonis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N.E.
730 (1929); 2 Wigmore § 282(a) (3 d ed. 1940).
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